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Abstract - In this paper we analyse the scientific contributions of Harvard economist John H. Williams as 
international trade theorist and monetary reformer, together with his activities as a Vice President of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In the first two Sections we present a succinct overview of Williams’ 
main contributions to international trade theory and to the interwar debate on the reform of the international 
monetary system. Particular attention will be devoted to his early academic writings which contained 
different critical arguments against the two main tenets of classical international economics: the Ricardian 
theory of comparative advantages and the gold standard. These criticisms formed the theoretical rationale 
and the analytical background of Williams’ key currency approach to the reform of the international 
monetary system. The key currency plan was first formulated when Williams advised Roosevelt and 
Morghenthau to sign a Tripartite agreement with Britain and France, and was later refined during the 
negotiations which concluded with the approval of the Bretton Woods agreements. In this respect, Section 4 
is devoted to the analysis of the contents of Williams’ proposal and to the reconstruction of his main 
criticisms of the two official plans presented by John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White. Section 5 is 
devoted to examining Keynes’ and White’s reactions and to elucidating what aspects of Williams’ ideas 
managed to influence the shaping of the Bretton Woods Agreements. Finally, Section 6 presents some 
general conclusions. Sections 4 and 5 have greatly benefited from the use of archival sources which have 
been quoted at length, mostly in the footnotes 
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1. Introduction 
 
Interwar economic events were a powerful source of inspiration for those economists who 
studied the relation between theory and current problems with a view to prescribe original solutions 
for policy authorities. If we examine the Presidential addresses at the annual meetings of the 
American Economic Association, we realize how the difficulty in reconciling past economic 
doctrines with the events which were profoundly disturbing the working of the international 
economic system was frequently deplored.
3 Many scholars denounced that the inherited corpus of 
economic theories – particularly those which were based on systems of universal laws – was 
inadequate and misleading. Others enquired whether the causes of economic maladjustments could 
exclusively be grouped in the short term of cyclical fluctuations which characterized the transition 
between equilibrium positions. Still others, more pragmatically, believed that the major 
imperfections lay with economic policies and the institutional framework which needed to be 
profoundly innovated and redesigned.
4  
 
In the Usa, this challenge to orthodoxy was cultivated by at least two distinct groups of 
professional economists. The first assembled those who, since their education and formative 
studies, began to show a strong preference for the study of international economic problems. From 
this perspective, the War together with the new international role acquired by the United States in 
the management of world economic and financial affairs, had provoked a blossoming of research 
activities in the fields of international monetary reforms, trade integration and stabilization policies. 
These were subjects which – with few exceptions – had been traditionally neglected by the most 
authoritative exponents of US economic thought, since the foundation of the American Economic 
Association. On the other hand, a powerful movement towards the elaboration of new ideas, 
techniques and policy proposals came from those scholars who, at some juncture of their academic 
career, had the opportunity to serve within the public administration. Also from this side, in the Usa 
the War had greatly increased the demand for economists as Government consultants and policy 
advisers. Their successful performance as members of public boards, think tanks and research 
institutes, had paved the way for more systematic exchanges and marked the beginning of a new era 
which was characterized by a proliferation of economists “in the public service”. Brilliant 
professional accomplishments were also achieved because the group was led by some of the most 
eminent authorities in the fields of money, trade and finance: Irving Fisher, Frank Taussig and 
Wesley Clair Mitchell were among those who most vigorously encouraged younger colleagues to 
follow their tracks as economists in the public service.
5  
 
After the 1929 crash, this new breed of “international scholars in action” made important 
contributions to the growth of US economic thought, favouring the opening of new fields of enquiry 
and the establishment of new research methods. As recent interpreters have argued, the creation of 
new professional opportunities in the fields of international economics and economic policy advice 
contributed significantly to the triumph of pluralism in US economics.
6 
 
Together with Edwin Kemmerer, Parker Willis, Jacob Viner and a few others, John H. 
Williams shared both these qualities. He was certainly one of the most prominent international 
political economists of the interwar years, with a profound knowledge of classical economics 
together with a strong preference for applied studies and the inductive verification of inherited 
theoretical models. Williams was also a renowned authority in monetary reforms and international 
finance, combining theoretical expertise with a strong bent for the practicalities of the everyday 
                                                           
3 See, among other, Fisher 1919; Mitchell 1925; Fetter 1925; Kemmerer 1927. 
4 Standard references are: Dorfman 1949-1957; Stein 1969; Davis 1971; Morgan – Rutherford 1998; Rutherford 1998. 
5 The expression is drawn from Fisher 1919. See also Coats 1992 and 1998; Asso 1994; Barber 1998. 
6 General reference: Morgan – Rutherford 1998; Rutherford 1998.   2
world. It was in the fields of international trade and finance that as a young economist he began to 
act as adviser to policy authorities.  
 
Throughout his life John Henry Williams was a man of two careers.
7 He studied at Harvard 
where, in 1919, he completed a Ph.D under the direction of Frank Taussig. His dissertation, on the 
Argentine balance of payments, was published by Harvard University Press and provided one of the 
first critical accounts of the classical approach to the Balance of Payments adjustment. Until 1925, 
Williams held temporary teaching positions at Brown, Princeton and Northwestern Universities, 
before he returned to Harvard as Associate professor of Economics. There he gained a full 
professorship in 1929 and, in 1947, was appointed as the first Dean of the Harvard Business School. 
As an economist in the public service, Williams’ career started in 1918 as Assistant in chief at the 
Dept of Commerce.
8 After a brief experience as Research economist at the American Bankers 
Association, on 1 May 1933, Williams joined the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as an expert 
in international monetary affairs. While retaining his professorship at Harvard, he became an 
assistant Federal Reserve agent.
9 Three years later he acquired a senior administrative position as 
vice-President and Research Director. At the New York Fed, Williams introduced a vast number of 
proposals for the reform of the domestic and international monetary system and fought hard to 
modernize the art of central banking after the poor performance exhibited by the federal monetary 
authorities during the depression. His professional life ended in the 1950s, when he held advisory 
positions in the US post-war commission on Foreign economic policy and in the US Economic 
Corporation Administration in Paris.  
 
Several interpreters have already recognized Williams’ originality as an international 
economist who made innovative contributions to economic thought and policy.
10 In this field, 
Williams remains well known for his early studies on the structure of the American Balance of 
Payments,
11 for his critical interpretation of the classical theory of international trade,
12 and for his 
unconventional analysis of the international gold standard.
13 The intense research activity which 
Williams conducted in these areas gave him a focus on the importance of macro-structures, 
economic history and empirical verification of established theoretical doctrines which he never lost 
throughout his life and deeply influenced his activities as a public servant and monetary reformer. 
 
As an economist in the public service, Williams started as an assistant to Herbert Hoover at 
the Department of Commerce. There he was commissioned to prepare reliable statistics on the US 
Balance of Payments, with particular responsibility for recent developments in capital transactions 
and the “invisible” items. As William Barber has observed, “in the history of the statistical work of 
the Federal government, this was a signal event. It marked the first occasion on which government 
itself generated the primary data, as opposed to relying on private organizations to supply them” 
(Barber 1985, 206, fn. 83). At the New York Fed, Williams began to get deeply involved in the 
study of monetary affairs, an area that soon fascinated him and was to remain a major interest 
                                                           
7 For Williams biography see Duesenberry, Lintner and Mason (1983). 
8 He worked in the Latin America division. 
9 Between 1932 and 1934 Williams also acted as US delegate at the World Economic Conference and participated to a 
Department of State Mission to investigate Latin American exchange problems. 
10 See among others Clark 1977; Cohen 1998; De Cecco 1976; Fishlow 1989; Gardner 1980; Flanders 1989; Ikenberrry 
1992; Rowlands 1976. We are particularly indebted to Marcello De Cecco who, in many of his works, has often 
recalled the importance of Williams’ ideas. His 1976 article on Us domestic and international financial markets since 
1945, has a rather strong incipit: “This is an essay in the anti-Ricardian tradition of J. H. Williams” (De Cecco 1976, 
381).  
11 In 1919 Williams contributed with Charles Bullock and Rufus Tucker a pioneering and descriptive study on the 
history of the US Balance of trade from 1789 to the end of the War [See Bullock, Tucker and Williams 1919]. In the 
following years Williams published regular updates of this work. 
12 Williams 1920b and Williams 1929.  
13 Williams 1932a, 1932b and Williams 1934.   3
throughout his life. According to his own private records,
14 between May 1933 and May 1954, 
Williams produced almost 200 pieces – mainly memoranda to the governors, bank committees or 
other parties but also reports, legislative proposals, and statistical enquiries. The subjects of 
Williams’ activities ranged widely from monetary and exchange rate policy to domestic banking 
policy and reform. Historians have studied Williams’ activities at the New York Fed. We include 
two recent references: “in the contributions of Williams more than anyone else”, David Laidler has 
found evidence in support of the pervasiveness of an early 1930s Chicago tradition in monetary 
economics.
15 In his very authoritative and monumental biography of the Federal Reserve, Allan 
Meltzer has confirmed that Williams contributed to shape Federal Reserve monetary policy: he had 
“considerable influence on policy throughout [his] long career at the Federal Reserve and was an 
ardent proponent of international coordination”.
16  
 
However, it is also well known that the most relevant portion of Williams’ activities at the 
Federal Reserve dealt with the elaboration of plans for international monetary stabilization. In 
particular, Williams’ writings have been considered as originating the so called “key currency 
approach” to the reform of the international monetary system. Peculiar to the “key currency 
approach” is the suggestion that the world can be hierarchically divided into countries, regions and 
currencies which are characterized by unequal economic size and importance.
17 On the contrary, 
established doctrines – like the Ricardian theory of comparative advantages or Hume’s price–
specie–flow mechanism and, above all, the conventional interpretation of the classical gold standard 
– were based on the flawed principle of homogeneous countries and perfectly symmetrical markets 
which found no correspondent in the real world. On these grounds, Williams thought that the 
preliminary condition for restoring stability and optimality in the post-war monetary system was to 
redesign the responsibility of key countries and set new rules for their currencies. The idea of key 
currency was also rather influential to the development of plans for monetary reforms based on a 
restricted number of countries or on a variable speed of participation. Among others, Robert 
Mundell has acknowledged the importance of Williams’ writings in a paper devoted to the 
reconstruction of his optimum currency areas.
18  
 
By the mid-1930s the “key currency approach” was introduced for the first time in the 
diplomatic agenda.
19 In close co-operation with the Taussig group of international economists who 
had by that time joined the Roosevelt administration (most particularly, Jacob Viner and Harry 
Dexter White), Williams strongly advised Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau to start informal 
discussions with France and Great Britain to re-establish some form of co-operation and stable 
relations in the management of exchange rates. Following these conversations, in 1936 the three 
countries signed a Tripartite Agreement which operated as a daily fixed exchange rate system 
between their respective currencies.
20  
 
Subsequent developments of the key currency idea led Williams to become the most 
authoritative voice against the two official plans which formed the intellectual backbone to the 
Bretton Woods agreements. Williams wrote the most influential “third” plan that appeared in Spring 
1943, at about the same time that the White and Keynes plans were published and became the 
                                                           
14 Archives of The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Williams papers. 
15 Laidler 1993. See also Tavlas 1997. 
16 Meltzer 2003. On several other issues Meltzer finds that Williams’ writings deserve particular attention. His critical 
essays on the first wave of proto–Keynesian models “anticipated major controversies about the effects of government 
spending, deficits and debt in the 1960s and 1970s” (Meltzer 2003, p. 610).  
17 See, on this aspect, Cohen 1998. 
18 Mundell 1997. 
19 See Williams 1937. 
20 Clark 1977. As Meltzer (2003, 540 and 545) notes, the importance of the Tripartite agreement was “more symbolic 
than substantive… as a political measure the agreement had greater merit”.   4
object of official negotiation. In a series of articles which were published in professional journals 
and in Foreign Affairs, in his activities at the New York Fed as well as in Congressional hearings, 
Williams raised a number of critical concerns against the proposal for the establishment of new 
international monetary institutions.
21 His views received a wide audience and elicited comments 
and replies from several economists in Government. His opposition created serious conflicts within 
the Administration and between the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve. 
 
Williams’ plan took the name of the “key currency plan”. Since its beginning, the main 
target of his campaign was White’s scheme for an International Stabilization Fund. Williams was 
particularly concerned about its technical functions and for the likely consequences of its failure on 
the post-war economic and political order. He believed that the new spirit of universal 
multilateralism had to be supported by the stabilizing role of hegemonic powers. Rather than an 
outright alternative to White’s scheme, his approach was conceived as a preliminary, more realistic 
step before post-war reconstruction was completed and the prospects for multilateral convertibility 
were put on more solid foundations. In the meanwhile, the “key currency plan” was meant as a 
challenge for the strong and hegemonic countries to recognize and to assume their responsibilities 
before the effective launching of new world organizations. 
 
While some scholars have argued that the Harvard boys under Frank Taussig in the 1930s 
were as influential as the Chicago boys under Milton Friedman in the 1970s,
22 Williams’ role in the 
discussions and negotiations of the post-war international monetary system has been unduly 
neglected. Many have dismissed it with the observation that, for different reasons, Williams’ key 
currency plan was soon brought into a blind alley: first, unlike the 1920s, the Federal Reserve now 
held a modest, insignificant role in international monetary affairs and diplomatic negotiations. After 
the depression, the wave of bank failures and the 1935 banking reform, central bankers in America 
had lost most of their power in monetary policy while responsibility in international negotiations 
rested firmly in the Treasury’s hands.
23 Second, Williams himself was initially involved in the 
discussions of the Economic and Financial Group at the Council for Foreign Relations which 
provided much of the intellectual background to White’s plan. Headed by Jacob Viner and Alvin 
Hansen, Williams was soon obliged to drop out from the Council because of his firm advocacy of 
an alternative plan.
24 Third, most delegations at Bretton Woods never seriously considered 




However, this is only partially true. As we shall see in this paper, Williams actively 
participated to the discussions and, to some extent, managed to influence the evolution of the drafts 
which eventually brought to the Joint Statement of Experts and to Bretton Woods. Since its first 
publication, Williams’ proposal gained some support within influential financial and intellectual 
circles – particularly among New York bankers and the leaders of small and open economies. 
Perhaps due to these circumstances, in the most crucial stages of the negotiations, Williams had two 
long meetings with Keynes at the New York Fed. Detailed minutes of these meetings were kept by 
a Federal Reserve economist and by Williams himself and provide a full, sometimes vivid, account 
of the group of experts at work. Also this episode has already been mentioned in the literature on 
                                                           
21 The standard reference, where most of these pieces are collected, remains Williams 1949. 
22 Liu 2002. 
23 One could add that the relative decline of power of the New York Fed was even more pronounced. See, again, 
Meltzer 2003. 
24 As stated in an interview of William Diebold Jr., research secretary for the Economic and Financial Group and quoted 
by Ikenberry 1992, 301. See also Shoup 197???. 
25 See, among others, Horsefield 1969; Ikenberry 1992; Skidelsky 2000; Meltzer 2003. In a recent article Bordo and 
Schwart have wondered – counterfactually – what would have happened to the international monetary system had the 
key currency approach been preferred to White’s International Stabilization Plan.   5
the making of the Bretton Woods Agreements, even though one of its most detailed accounts has 
downplayed its importance.
26 By contrast, our examination of the full minutes of these meetings – 
together with other archival materials – will lead us to argue that Williams’ views managed to exert 
some “conditionality” on the final articles of agreement ratified at Bretton Woods in 1944. We shall 
also show how Keynes himself agreed with many of Williams’ critical arguments and how the “key 
currency” idea can be considered a part of the architecture of the post-war international monetary 
system. Again, Allan Meltzer has recently strengthened our valuation that “as the system developed, 
Williams’ proposal for an international system based on the dollar soon supplanted many of the 
features of the Keynes – White plan” (Meltzer 2003, 585). 
 
In this paper we first intend to investigate the analytical background of Williams’ key 
currency approach to the reform of the international monetary system. In this perspective, Sections 
2 and 3 present a succinct overview of Williams’ main contributions to international trade theory 
and to the interwar debate on the reform of the international monetary system. Particular attention 
will be devoted to his early academic writings which contained different critical arguments against 
the two main tenets of classical international economics: the Ricardian theory of comparative 
advantages and the gold standard. These criticisms formed the theoretical rationale of his key 
currency proposal. Then, in Section 4, we analyse the contents of Williams’ proposal and 
reconstruct his main criticisms of the two official plans presented by John Maynard Keynes and 
Harry Dexter White. Section 5 is devoted to the examination of Keynes’ and White’s reactions and 
to the elucidation of what aspects of Williams’ ideas managed to influence the shaping of the 
Bretton Woods Agreements. Finally, Section 6 presents some general conclusions. Sections 4 and 5 




2. Williams’ criticism of international trade theory 
 
According to Williams, since the first industrial revolution, international trade and 
integration played a crucial role in determining the rate of economic growth and technological 
change, as well as the cyclical downturns and the spreading of depressions. 
 
As many other thoughtful international economists who had worked under Frank Taussig’s 
supervision,
27 Williams moved from the presumption that the pattern of comparative advantages did 
not tell the whole story in international productive specialization and the evolution of the patterns of 
trade. He also believed that, only under very specific conditions, terms of trade variations and 
nominal price changes represented the most important variable in the adjustment process of the 
economic system to external shocks. Starting from these premises, Williams’ critical appraisal of 
the classical theory of international trade was based on four issues which were meant to undermine 
both its methodological foundations and the peculiar nature of its essential assumptions. 
 
2.1  On method 
Having acquired a very critical attitude toward Ricardian economics from the reading of Walter 
Bagehot and Thomas Cliff Leslie, since his early writings Williams disputed the pretension of 
universality which characterized classical economic laws.
28 As a methodological device for 
theoretical exposition, Williams was convinced that the classical approach retained some usefulness 
                                                           
26 Van Dormael 1978. 
27 Perhaps, this group produced on these topics the most impressive collection of PhD dissertations in the history of 
economic thought. The most wellknown, besides Williams 1920, were: Graham 1921-1922 and 1923; Viner 1924; 
Angell 1926; White 1933. 
28 “As a graduate student nothing interested me more than the writings of the heretics” (Williams 1948, 3).   6
and validity, even though it had severe limitations if applied to such post-war problems as German 
reparations or currency instability (Williams 1920a). Perhaps, it was also the proximity with 
Schumpeter at Harvard and his personal friendship with Jacob Viner, which led Williams to extend 
the dangers of a Ricardian vice to the mainstream tradition of international economics. In fact, as 
many contemporary inductive verifications confirmed, the classical theory of international trade 
was based on very restrictive assumptions which ruled out the really dynamic forces at work. In his 
view “the classical theory assumes as fixed, for purposes of the reasoning, the very things which in 
my view should be the chief objects of study if what we wish to know is the effects and causes of 




Historically, Williams believed that the international transfer of productive factors – mainly 
capital, labour and entrepreneurship – had played a paramount role in the long-run cumulative 
changes of the industrialized world which the comparative static nature of classical trade theory did 
not fully take into account. Therefore, he suggested that particular attention ought to be directed to 
unveil the connections between foreign investments, short-term capital movements, commodity 
trade and income growth. Reliance on Ricardo’s model had rendered these connections extremely 
weak even though they were the “more significant part of the explanation of the present status of 
nations, as to incomes, prices, well being, than is the cross-section value analysis of the classical 
economists, with its assumption of given quantities of productive factors, already existent and 
employed” (Williams 1929). As an alternative, Williams suggested that international trade and 
capital movements should be studied “from the point of view of history” and primarily “from the 
point of view of their effect on the development of nations” (Williams 1928 also quoted by 
Dorfman 1959, V, 584-585). 
 
From a methodological point of view, Williams also observed that international trade and 
monetary issues raised the most intriguing questions about the optimal relation between theory and 
policy (Williams 1929). If international economists had not been able to provide satisfactory 
responses to the economic consequences of the War and to the World depression, again much of the 
blame fell on abstract theorizing. Post-war events had not changed this attitude in any significant 
way: “one of the greatest paradoxes of recent times is that, while since 1914 the world has been in a 
state of profound and virtually continuous disturbance, formal international trade theory has 
continued to emphasize equilibrating tendencies” (Williams 1952a). On these grounds, most 
modern refinements of the Ricardian model were also based on the mistaken tendency “to run away 




2.2.  Trade, growth and economic geography.  
According to Williams, factors endowments, different cost ratios as well the distortions 
induced by protectionist commercial policies provided only a partial explanation of the patterns of 
trade.  
 
Williams started from the premise that the world was composed of very heterogeneous 
countries whose economic systems were characterized by markedly different stages of 
development. Countries of unequal size and divergent economic structures could be grouped in 
centre or “key” countries and peripheral countries. His approach to international trade theory and 
policy can be fairly summarized by the following quotation: “This is not a world with many 
countries mutually held in balance through compensatory internal adjustments … [but] a world with 
                                                           
29 It maybe noted that while Williams observed that Leslie’s major weakness was that he did not develop a rival system, 
he also blamed Keynes’ General Theory for sharing Ricardo’s bias of universal application of a body of principles to all 
times and countries.   7
one or two predominant key countries and with many peripheral countries which are all subject to 
profound changes also in their attitudes towards internal adjustment … at least until some decisive 
steps are made toward common sovereignty” (Williams 1951, 40-41).  
 
In many of his writings Williams interpreted “the development of international trade as a 
process of expansion from a centre” (Williams 1953b, 10) which profoundly affected the economic 
performance of its periphery. Thus, “key countries” played a paramount role in the determination of 
international cycles and trends. Recent history, in fact, taught that periods of growth (as well as 
depressions) were generally originated in the core country while countries outside the centre owed 
their development, and often their very existence to the movement of factors as well as of capital 
goods from the centre. Williams also argued that the establishment of a stable network of peripheral 
countries was often indispensable for the survival of the centre, since it provided cheap labour and a 
steady demand for exports in the technologically most advanced sectors.  
 
This stadial interpretation of economic development was refined with two closely connected 
considerations: first, the international monetary system – particularly whenever it was based on a 
common standard – was a powerful mechanism of propagation of shocks from key countries to their 
periphery; second, any theory of international trade which did not approach the subject matter in 
this way (cumulative changes and interactions between core and periphery) had very serious 
limitations as a guide to policy. Here again, Williams strongly suggested that any international 
economist should feel the inadequacies of static equilibrium analysis. Economists were facing just 
another “great paradox” of modern economic theory: “though international trade has been 
peculiarly characterized by growth and change, economists have continued to discuss it 
theoretically in static terms” (Williams 1953b, 9). 
 
Williams also drew attention to the fact that exploitation of comparative advantages could be 
limited by market imperfections and failures which classical economists did not fully take into 
account or – again – simply assumed away from their premises. In particular, peripheral countries 
suffered from “inferior organization of capital and labour …, inferior domestic banking, inferior 
internal means of communication, inferior perception of economic opportunity” (Williams 1929, 
31). More than their relative natural endowment of productive factors, such a varying degree of 
domestic backwardness in capital markets and the quality of information were additional 
determinants of the international hierarchy among countries and of the way the patterns of world 
trade followed the patterns of the world key direct investors, rather than the other way around. It 
was not by chance – Williams noted with great perceptiveness – that the performance of developing 
countries depended greatly on their capacity to build a cosmopolitan centre within their region 
which had a strategic importance for the intermediation of foreign finance, and where the presence 
of large-scale foreign enterprises mainly in the extractive and transport industries was particularly 
high (Williams 1929). Thus, capital transactions had a great impact in the performance of the 
domestic economy and for the determination of the structure of commodity trade.  
 
Finally, relative positions between core and peripheries were not intrinsically static: on the 
contrary recent events showed that there was much room for processes of cumulative change. In his 
writings it is often observed that “the greatest single change which has occurred since 1914 has 
been in the comparative international position of the United States and England” (Williams 1932a, 
272). They basically depended on the real long-run factors which affected levels of productivity 
and, by the political processes, which historically influenced stages of integration or disintegration 
of a regional or multilateral nature. Again, in order to fully understand the nature of these changes 
specific attention had to be devoted to the effects of the relative movement of productive factors – 
primarily capital.  
   8
2.3.  Mobility of factors.  
Williams thought that the most disturbing element of the Ricardian model was to be found in 
the international mobility of capital which the classical economists had generally assumed away for 
reasons of formal accuracy or for the prevailing “home bias” sentiments.
30 Under Taussig’s 
guidance, Williams developed critical arguments against classical monetary theory, whose 
discussion of factors mobility was merely confined to problems connected with the balancing of 
international payments (Williams 1920b; 1929). On the contrary, capital movements and the 
international environment had pride of place in Williams’ explanation of economic growth and 
domestic stability. In his view, the real functioning of the pre-1914 gold standard relied to a 
significant extent on the stabilizing function of short-term capital movements. What was even more 
relevant was that the factors immobility assumption had to be rejected in order to understand not 
only recurrent episodes of panic and crisis in financial markets but also business cycles, market 
failures and the efficacy of economic policy.  
 
Williams shared the heterodox view that productive factors had traditionally moved more 
freely between – rather than within – nations.
31 Countries at different stages of economic 
development had experimented with episodes of massive migration and capital movements which 
had important effects on their long-run economic performance. In his empirical studies, he also 
showed the existence of important interactions between the capital account and the current account; 
the former generally exerting the more powerful influence upon the latter by means of exchange 
rate and interest rates variations. On the whole, capital movements were an endogenous factor in the 
adjustment mechanism, a crucial element in exchange rate depreciation, a key determinant of the 
stability of macroeconomic aggregates. Their overall significance was greater than the one played 
by changes in the terms of trade and in comparative factors productivity
32.  
 
Capital and labour movements were also the most important single factor that favoured a 
shift in relative growth rates. Neglect of “core-periphery” implications served to explain why most 
recent contributions of neoclassical trade theory failed to pass the test of reality. Massive migration 
of capital and labour did not bring about an intrinsic tendency towards income or price equalization 
on a world scale (Williams 1929, 30). In his writings, Williams discussed at some length the 
circumstance that foreign direct investments could stimulate a more rapid rate of advance of 
productivity in the lending country than in the borrowing country and thus create further disparities 
in the patterns of growth. The recent surge of US foreign direct investments in the 1920s, he wrote, 
had significantly contributed to the expansion of the US domestic economy, setting in motion a 
virtuous circle: increasing returns, higher profit margins, and the establishment of a more efficient 
network of productive capacity which, in its turn, was the reason for new investments and a further 
cumulative rise of productivity.
33 Foreign investments by American enterprises were also 
interpreted as a sort of indirect insurance against domestic market failures. Among them, Williams 
considered the frequent incidence of phenomena of adverse selection which had affected the US 
credit market in the 1920s.  
 
 
                                                           
30 On the basis of his early writings on the inductive verification of the balance of payments adjustment process, June 
Flanders (1989) concluded that Williams could be labelled as a late classical economist because he focused on specific 
cases of disturbances to the classical mechanism and introduced some dynamic element in the classical picture. On the 
classical economists and capital movements, see Asso (2002). 
31 Williams 1929, pp. 24ff. Among others, Williams quoted Bagehot, Cliff Leslie as anticipators of his views. 
32 Williams analysis of the effects of an exogenous real shock on trade flows prefigured the income or absorption 
approach to the balance of payments, in contrast to the prevailing acceptance of the price elasticity approach (Williams 
1920b). 
33 See Williams 1951. Britain’s capacity to exploit this virtuous circle, helped to understand why, for a long time, “[it] 
has been able to concentrate capital and labour on a small amount of land” (Williams 1929, 34).    9
2.4.  Criticism of equilibrium analysis.  
In his early studies on Argentina’s balance of payments, Williams criticized the 
comparatively static approach which generally pervaded the theory of international trade. Both 
classical and modern models, in fact, were exclusively designed in terms of a partial equilibrium 
framework, placing different emphasis on the equilibrating forces at work. Rather ambitiously, 
Williams’ approach tried to establish connections between trade flows, foreign investments, output, 
employment and the balance of payments. Again, his arguments rested on empirical verification 
which showed the non-existence of alternative stages of equilibrium. In fact, international trade and 
finance were influenced by a series of overlapping changes – “working some time in the same 
direction, some times at cross-purposes” [Williams 1920a] – which rendered equilibrium analysis 
rather meaningless and artificial. In international economics no analysis of the forces making for 
economic equilibrium was useful to illuminate this field and changes were not sufficiently 
systematic to lend themselves to a sort of equilibrium theory. Particularly if countries adopted 
inconvertible monetary standards, “this reasoning from artificially simplified stages of equilibrium 
through periods of transition to new stages of equilibrium” had little interpretative value. For 
Williams it remained “a characteristic product of the Ricardian mode of thought” [Williams 1920a].  
 
Therefore, in the interwar years, the distinction between short-term factors – whose 
operation created instability and maladjustments – and long-run forces – which inevitably worked 
on behalf of stable equilibrium – was deemed to be utterly misleading. On the contrary, transitions 
from one core to another – like the one that occurred between Great Britain and the United States 
after WWI – produced a shift away from equilibrium and smooth adjustments, also because of 
structural changes. For example, the emergence of the US economy as the core trading country had 
managed to produce a number of shocks which negatively affected stability and growth. Among 
them Williams emphasized its great size and the strength of its home market; its diversified 
resources and the large exports surplus; its comparative self sufficiency; and its more rapid pace of 
innovation and productivity growth (Williams 1952b, 176). Using similar arguments to Albert 
Hirschman’s analysis of the “influence effects” applied to the Nazi economy (Hirschman 1945), 
Williams argued that all these features generated a greater dependence of the rest of the World on 
the American economy, rather than conversely. They represented objective circumstances which 
explained deep-seated, long-term imbalances in international payments and led him to suggest the 
diagnosis of chronic “dollar shortages”. 
 
In retrospect, one could say that Williams’ contributions to international trade theory and his 
criticism of standard economic theory lacked formal accuracy and suffered from vagueness
34. 
Nevertheless, they contained many original seeds which profoundly influenced subsequent 
developments of trade theory and international political economy. For Williams, what mattered was 
that they were also strictly connected to evaluate the orthodox interpretation of the real functioning 
of monetary systems and adjustment mechanisms – beginning with the international gold standard. 
This was another crucial step toward the development of  new principles for the reform of the 
international monetary system in the interwar years and must be considered in detail. 
 
 
3. Williams’ criticism of the international gold standard and monetary policy 
 
On several occasions, Williams disputed the conventional interpretation of the gold standard 
as a monetary system which provided an automatic mechanism for balance of payments adjustment 
and a neutral set of rules for economic policy authorities. In his view there was nothing intrinsically 
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automatic in the functioning of the gold standard. Williams’ criticism of the gold standard model 
moved from the specific nature of its assumptions and his interpretation echoed many arguments 
which we have already found in his writings on international trade theory (Williams 1932a and b).  
 
In what follows we have chosen to discuss three points which are quite recurrent in his 
writings. They concern the role of capital movements and their effects on economic performance 
and the efficacy of monetary policy.  
 
3.1. Capital movements and the adjustment process. 
According to Williams, the gold standard was a monetary system which operated on the 
basis of a core-periphery structure: its stability depended on the existence of a common centre “with 
which the other countries were connected through trade and finance” (Williams 1944a). In fact, the 
smooth working of the pre-war international monetary system in its heyday until 1914, depended on 
the strategic and hegemonic role played by key countries – particularly Britain – which helped to 
enforce policy discipline and international co-ordination. To our knowledge, Williams was among 
the first economists to suggest that, until 1914, the system was really based on a sterling standard 
rather than on gold and that the reasons why the system worked so well were to be found in the 
specific roles which the countries – both at the core and at the periphery – agreed to behave. 
Williams noted that exchange rate stability depended on sterling acting as the “key currency” of the 
system. “Key” in the sense that sterling was the vehicle of all international transactions on both the 
current and the capital account while a growing demand for sterling-denominated assets financed 
Britain’s structural external deficits. The crisis of the international gold standard coincided with the 
relative decline of the British economy. In this respect, Williams thought that the War had simply 
hastened a process of change which was already well under way (Williams 1953b). 
 
This picture sharply contrasted with traditional gold standard theory which was based on the 
principle of interaction between homogeneous countries of approximately equal economic size and 
structure (Williams 1944a).  
 
Williams recognized that the gold standard had the great merit to give monetary policy a 
clear and definite objective. However, he often criticized as false and abstract the dilemma – which 
Keynes had emphasised in 1923 – between internal and external stability. As he saw them, modern 
economic systems were characterized by a growing interdependence between internal and external 
components of aggregate demand. For peripheral countries, economic growth greatly depended on 
the performance of leading economies. If the latter were unsuccessful, the former could not be 
maintained, regardless of policy attitudes or nominal flexibility in price or wage setting. 
 
Williams agreed with many interpreters that the most serious defects of the gold standard as 
a mechanism of adjustment depended on the growing rigidity of internal prices and costs, which 
ultimately explained the phenomenon of gold mal-distribution. In the most advanced countries 
prices remained insensitive to gold movements, particularly downwards. The presence of rigidities 
also reduced the opportunity to construct an economic or monetary policy around the focus of 
exchange rate stability: “in the view of many economists, we must find ways of lessening rigidities 
or find ourselves forced to give up the free price-quantity system of economic adjustment 
altogether” (Williams 1937). Moreover, gold standard rules required pro-cyclical policies which 
most governments were quite unwilling to follow, particularly those who were forced to accept 
contraction and unemployment whenever gold flowed out. 
 
However, apart from the reduced flexibility of most contemporary economic systems, the 
second and most serious source of troubles “for any international monetary system” was to be found 
in the mobility of productive factors – most specifically, capital. His studies on Argentina had   11
shown that capital inflows had a great impact on the gold premium, which established unfavourable 
connections with exchange rate variations and the burden of the public debt service. The stability 
and the adjustment of the Argentine economy depended not only on domestic conditions or price 
flexibility but were mainly connected to the vagaries of the international cycle and to the abrupt 
decline of inward capital flows.
35  
 
Starting from these premises, Williams wrote many essays to discuss the perverse role of 
capital movements to the stability of any international monetary system and as a major cause of 
economic recessions and their international propagation.
36 In this context, Williams denounced 
contemporary economists for not having given proper consideration to the causes and ultimate 
effects of short-term capital movements. They had passively accepted the classical doctrine which 
assumed that capital movements held a balancing function in the adjustment process of external 
shocks. Most of the times, however, their behaviour followed different rules of the game than were 
generally assumed by classical economic theory.  
 
Again, factual knowledge and empirical research helped. Economists could find out that not 
only was capital an extremely mobile and fluctuating item of the balance of payments – indeed its 
most mobile and fluctuating one – but it basically flowed in the opposite direction from the one 
assumed by Hume’s mechanism. In fact, inductive verifications had shown that there was no 
offsetting tendency between domestic inflation and the export of capital: rising prices were often 
accompanied by further capital inflows, since net foreign investments were attracted by surging 
economic activity and favourable profit expectations. On the contrary, in times of sluggish business 
confidence and economic depression, many economies generally experienced a flight from their 
currencies and net capital outflows which worsened the external account (Williams 1932a, 272ff).  
 
Williams was also struck by how quickly and easily the current account adjusted to – and 
was dominated by – the capital account, rather than the other way round. Even if the terms of trade 
changed in the direction predicted by the classical theory, Williams thought that these changes were 
too small to have been responsible for the recorded shifts in the balance of trade.
37 Moreover, for 
some countries free access to the international capital market was a major cause of intergenerational 
problems and structural imbalances: in fact, it served to postpone fundamental readjustment of their 
economic system by offsetting long-term capital exports with short-term capital imports.   
 
For all these reasons, it followed that the gold standard was not a reliable corrective 
mechanism of capital movements. For many countries, its traditional rules of the game did not 
operate while the quantity theory of money had only a rather limited validity. Other effects 
stimulated by aggregate expenditure and the transfer of purchasing power held primary 
responsibility of adjustment processes. Ever since the early 1930s he shared Keynes’ belief that the 
addition of a borrowing authority to supplement the use of a central bank’s reserves represented a 
major step forward for the implementation of international stabilization plans (Williams 1931). 
 
3.2. Capital movements and the propagation of cyclical instability 
Williams also discussed at length the possibility that international capital movements could 
become the vehicle for worldwide booms and depressions. The network of financial connections 
between core and peripheral countries served to explain why the gold standard was a means for 
spreading “depressions, and sometimes booms, from one country to another” (Williams 1944a, 
171). In times of crisis, Williams argued that the gold standard could become a mechanism for 
growing disequilibria and the production of disturbances which extended to neighbouring countries. 
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Adherence to an exchange rate commitment and to schemes of international coordination inhibited 
monetary authorities from undertaking desirable stabilization policies. 
 
Consistent with his functional interpretation of the gold standard, Williams again found the 
main seeds of the contagion in the growing interdependence between the external and the internal 
economy: a sudden cessation of capital movements and the burden of fixed interest charges 
produced depressive effects in the capital-importing countries which “then may spread back through 
the channels of trade to the capital-exporting, interest-receiving countries” (Williams 1932a). 
Whenever the drain of foreign capitals had reached abnormal levels, capital movements provoked 
the too familiar sentiments which had fuelled the world depression and unemployment far beyond 
their cyclical swings: uncertainty, distrust and speculative excesses tended to produce cumulative 
one-way movements. While monetary policy had limited powers to offset them, it was no sheer 
coincidence – so Williams wrote in 1932 – that most episodes of booms and depressions had 
international capital movements as one of their most prominent features (Williams 1932a).  
 
From what we have seen, it is not surprising that Williams remained a life-long advocate of 
exchange controls. In his view, abnormal capital movements from core to peripheral countries were 
the international counterpart of domestic runs on the banks and other forms of “internal money 
panics” which had played such a large part in economic history. Being “the most volatile item of the 
balance of payments” (Williams 1937, p. 29), capital movements managed to dominate and even 
nullify alternative corrective policies which were designed to support macroeconomic stabilization. 
What was worse, it sometimes occurred that they produced real policy dilemmas and reduced the 
efficacy of monetary policy. One possible explanation was that, in the presence of unfettered capital 
movements, expectations tended to become “self-fulfilling”. Many historical episodes provided 
interesting evidence in this respect: raising the rate of discount to protect the internal economy 
against a capital flight had often intensified deflationary pressures and had been taken as a symbol 
of fear that further flight would undermine the stability of the exchange rate, “which has led to 
further flight”. Other situations may occur whereby “a rise in the rate designed to curb internal 
expansion may attract short-time funds from abroad” (Williams 1937 p. 29). Finally, the 
destabilizing nature of capital movements also depended on the weak connections between the 
financial and the real sectors of the economy. Empirical research supported this conclusion, 
showing how frequent it was that the main purpose of international capital movements was not to 
create new productive capacity but to meet extraordinary expenses of unproductive nature 
(Williams 1932a).  
 
In terms of policy, throughout the 1930s, Williams advocated world economic co-operation 
as the best method to cope with contractions of output and employment. With the rise of rival 
financial centres after the end of WWI, Williams believed that stability of international agreements 
and policy co-ordination depended on the negotiation of credible commitments. Discussing this 
issue with Keynes, Williams maintained that the gold standard was just “a short-hand phrase for 
exchange stability” which was achieved by monetary discipline imposed by a country’s sense of its 
obligations to other countries and by informal central banks cooperation.
38 In his view, policy 
credibility was an important requisite to increase policy efficiency and counteract downward 
cyclical variations of the relevant macroeconomic magnitudes. He thought that the best way for 
monetary authorities to discourage destabilizing speculation and control the volume of capital 
movements was their “demonstration of purpose and capacity” to maintain a system of fixed 
exchange rates by mutual exchange of information, by the practice of currency swaps, and by a 
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declaration of unlimited support of each other’s currencies in case of need.
39 Since 1935 Williams 
pressed the Roosevelt administration for a firm agreement on exchange rate stability to be achieved 
by a daily gold settlement at fixed nominal rates of the three key international currencies. With 
respect to the other requirements of international co-operation, he remained well aware that the 




3.3. Monetary policy and the art of central banking 
In the 1930s Williams gave important contributions to the analysis of monetary policy and 
to the interpretation of the great depression. While at Harvard and at the New York Fed, he tried to 
understand the mechanisms of transmission of monetary forces and the way monetary authorities 
could increase their capacity to stabilize the economy, both domestic and international. His early 
criticism of the quantity theory of money did not prevent him from pointing out the danger that, in 
the 1930s, monetary theorists had swung too drastically from overemphasis to extreme 
underemphasis of the role money supply. He believed that monetary authorities could regain control 
over the economic system by strengthening their capacity to control the credit market and increase 
their level of independence from the Treasury. 
 
Williams’ essays on monetary policy together with his reports on banking reform contained 
critical remarks of Federal Reserve policy before and during the Depression. Williams espoused the 
thesis – which had been elaborated by his Ph.D student, Laughlin Currie, by Jacob Viner and others 
– that the Federal Reserve System was responsible for precipitating the American economy in the 
Great Depression. He himself saw serious errors by the Fed in the banking crisis which in the first 
half of the 1930s brought the American credit system very close to collapse. Under different 
perspectives the Federal Reserve System was faulty. It basically lacked effective powers of banking 
supervision and had no capacity to safeguard the solvency of banks (Williams 1935).  
 
Williams put forward interesting arguments to substantiate the widespread scepticism 
towards monetary policy and its capacity to maintain macroeconomic stability. In the worst days of 
the economic depression, he declared little faith in the effectiveness of interest rate policy to 
stabilize business conditions and to reflate the economy. His perceptions were based on a negative 
correlation between a cheap monetary policy, the safeguarding of the profit margins of the banking 
system and the restoration of business confidence. Anti depression policies did not require a 
countercyclical expansion of the monetary base because interest rate reductions had perverse effects 
on the solidity of bank assets and provoked a deterioration of the balance sheet of commercial 
banks.  
 
Scepticism about the effects of monetary policy again depended on the weak connections 
between the banking sector and the real sector. Interest rate policy exerted little influence on 
investment decisions while practices of borrowers’ discrimination and credit rationing were more 
important factors influencing the money market (Williams 1931, 248ff). The main channel of 
transmission of monetary policy depended on the impact of interest rate variations on the 
availability of bank credit. From his reading of Keynes’ monetary essays Williams added two 
further considerations: first he believed that small changes in interest rates did not have any great 
effect on economic activity and prices, while large changes were likely to have negative effects on 
business expectations. Secondly, he thought that the fundamental cause of the world economic 
depression was the persistent gap between long-term and short-term interest rates. He believed that 
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Keynes’ Treatise had not succeeded in explaining causes and remedies of this discrepancy. In his 
1931 long review-article of Keynes’ new book, Williams argued that Keynes’ monetary theory was 
built on the wrong assumption that the long-term financial market was extremely sensitive to 
changes in the bank rate. By contrast, reality showed that a wide gap fragmented the capital market 
while there were non-monetary difficulties which basically affected aggregate demand and which 
“[we]re not sufficiently amenable to monetary action” (Williams 1931, 252ff). In this context, the 
distinction put forward by Keynes and other business cycle theorists between the market rate and 
the natural rate of interest did not represent an important theoretical advance: it was rather a 
rhetorical gimmick, since “the natural rate is not visible; it is an abstraction” [Williams 1931, 248].  
 
According to Williams, ever since its foundation, the Federal Reserve System had been 
dominated by advocates of the “real bills doctrine” who denied any relation between their acts and 
inflation. The System’s adherence to the real bills doctrine – combined with a belief that a “natural” 
purging of speculative excesses was necessary to set the stage for price stabilization and recovery – 
led to the failure of monetary policy. Whatever the intellectual origin of the Federal Reserve Act, 
Williams believed that the real bills doctrine was of little use when trying to understand post-war 
mechanisms and effects of monetary policy. In particular, after the 1919 economic recession, many 
business concerns “shied away from banking loans, with the result that commercial paper, already 
diminishing in relative importance before the war was reduced to only 12% of bank assets in 1929 
and 8% today”. Therefore, the notion of “eligible paper” should be replaced by the notion of “sound 
assets” (Williams 1936). 
 
These changes in the character of central and commercial banking – Williams observed – 
coincided with the emergence of a new phenomenon in the credit market. Banks developed a strong 
preference for the selection of comparatively low risk operations, such as the purchase of 
government securities at the expense of the investment needs of private enterprises (Williams 
1945). Williams thought that the growth of public debt had produced revolutionary changes in both 
central and commercial banking, and he watched with preoccupation the growing tendency of banks 
to hold secondary reserves of government securities. He also observed that high bank earnings 
coincided with periods of low but stable interest rates which determined an increasing volume of 
safe transactions in the market for public bonds and a more efficient management of the public debt 
structure. On the other hand, commercial banks had become extremely vulnerable to interest rate 
changes because most of their assets were concentrated in government bonds. As a consequence 
Williams feared that all economic subjects (“the public and the Treasury, as well as the banks”), 
were developing strong vested interests in the stability of interest rates which, in fact, had become 
the primary objective of monetary policy (Williams 1945, 219). 
 
On the grounds of this diagnosis, in order to increase the efficiency of monetary policy, 
Williams frequently wrote in support of the creation of a modern central bank machinery for credit 
control and the maintenance of economic stability. In his writings and in his official activities, 
Williams favoured legislation which extended the scope of Reserve Banks’ lending operations and 
reorganized the Federal reserve system with a view to increase its powers of direct credit controls 
and supervision. Central monetary authority needed to be transformed from an agency which 
provided an elastic credit supply to meet the needs of investment and trade into an agency for credit 
control. As he wrote in a report on central banking, the philosophy which had inspired the 1913 
Federal Reserve Act needed to be reconsidered: “there has arisen since the War a great diversity of 
views with respect to the status and functions of central banking institutions; their relations to 
government and to the commercial banks; their responsibility for currency and credit control”.
41 
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To increase the flexibility of the credit market and enhance the control capacities of the 
Federal Reserve System, Williams suggested a drastic revision of the character of central banking. 
He dismissed as unrealistic all proposals which found inspiration in the recent wave of European 
banking reforms and policy innovations. Major conversion operations of the public debt would have 
shaken confidence in the Treasury solvency, while he opposed the transformation of commercial 
banking into State-owned enterprises. His writings contain several suggestions regarding possible 
reforms in the art of central banking. First, he denounced the fact that the Federal monetary 
authorities lacked the means for efficient banking supervision. They had no powers to prevent 
banking excesses to ensure the solvency of banks, particularly in non-commercial assets. Credit 
controls – Williams observed – were no longer a question of measuring the adequacy of reserve 
requirements but needed to be exerted over the quality and soundness of bank assets: “inability of 
the banks to borrow from the reserve banks upon sound assets … was not due … to defects in the 
machinery of organization and utilization of reserves, but to a general impairment in the value of 
banks assets so great as to reveal very strikingly the underlying weakness in our whole system of 
banking organization and supervision”. Williams put the blame for the higher failure rate of 
American banks compared to Canadian or British banks to bad loans and limited diversification.
42 
Thus, the modernization of the American banking system required the development of more 
efficient methods of “relationship banking” between central and commercial banks. The inadequacy 
of contacts was viewed by Williams as one possible explanation of the reasons why the 1929 stock 
market crash had turned into a general collapse of the credit system. In particular, at the worst stage 
of the depression, many banks suffered from the absence of a lender of last resort and found 
themselves forced to dispose of sound assets by sale, thus contributing heavily to the general 
deflation and undermining their own solvency (Williams 1936).  
 
Secondly, Williams proposed that Central Banks should be given a considerable amount of 
discretion and independence when dealing with the system of commercial banks on the one hand 
and the government on the other: “as regards commercial banks, the Central bank must have power 
to control them unaffected by profit-seeking considerations”. Regarding the difficult relationship 
with the Treasury, Williams believed that a more definite delegation of discretionary powers was 
“desirable and necessary in order to safeguard against the possibility of hastily considered or 
politically determined actions”. Central bank credibility for credit and currency control would be 
strengthened and rendered more efficient if independence in monetary policy decisions was among 
its prerogatives (Williams 1935). Proposals in this direction ranged from a general prohibition from 
buying government securities other than in the open market to an increase of salaries of Board 
members in order to enhance their status and autonomy. He also favoured increased centralization 
of the powers of credit controls without impairing the regional character of the reserve system. In 
his view, the concept of the Federal Reserve Board as a board of review of policy decisions of the 
reserve banks without powers to initiate changes in policy had created confusion, an excessive 
diffusion of responsibility, cumbersomeness and delay. He saw in the creation of an Open market 
committee a real piece of central bank machinery and the right solution to clarify the policy 




4. Williams’ plan for international monetary reform: the key currency approach 
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4.1. Criticism of  official plans  
Since the beginning of the negotiations for a new monetary order, Williams was actively 
involved in the discussions which eventually led to the approval of the Bretton Woods agreements. 
Williams activities ranged around three main aspects which will be the object of our analysis in this 
and the following Sections. They regarded:  
 
1. A detailed criticism of the two official plans 
2. The elaboration and the defence of an alternative plan based on the stabilization of the world key 
currencies 
3. The participation in the negotiations in order to introduce amendments in the official plans in line 
with the key currency approach 
 
As we shall see below, Williams’s criticism was equally addressed to White and Keynes. 
However, at least at the beginning of the negotiations, he thought that the US proposal deserved 
greater support for reasons of political opportunity: among them he mentioned the fact that a 
Clearing Union would put the Fed in a difficult position because of its inflationary bent. As he put it 
in a letter to the Board of Governors of July 1943, “the provision of foreign exchange resources to 
other countries on the scale suggested by Keynes would be an extremely hazardous undertaking 
from the standpoint of this country”.
44 On these grounds, White’s scheme was to be preferred also 
because the US were granted more veto powers.
45 
 
As a monetary reformer, Williams received widespread recognition within American 
economics. He believed that the key currency approach did not offer an outright substitute for a 
full-scale international agreement on exchange rate stabilization nor a new mechanism for balance 
of payments adjustment. As he wrote to the governor of the Bank of Canada, Louis Rasminsky, he 
had “no desire to be the spearhead of any countermovement”.
46 However, he thought that the 
introduction of the White plan needed to be preceded by the stabilization of key currencies which 
would make the establishment of a new international monetary order more gradual and sustainable. 
In this manner, he felt sure that the risks of failure of the new ambitious institutions would be 
greatly minimized.  
 
William found several major shortcomings in the two official plans which were respectively 
related to their theoretical vision, technical provisions and institutional setting. He also believed that 
some improvements were made during the negotiations.  
 
First of all, White’s and Keynes’ proposals to establish a multilateral system of fixed but 
adjustable exchange rates was too abstract and ambitious: the two plans were “like a mirage”, being 
full of “high sounding words and sentiments that do not get us anywhere”.
47 In fact, the lessons of 
the 1920s stabilization plans advised against the immediate determination of new exchange rate 
parities. Williams thought that the current exchange rate structure was meaningless, and that 
member countries needed time to find a new, sustainable relationship between their respective 
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currencies. For a long time after the end of the War the initial par value of all currencies could not 
be determined with any degree of scientific accuracy. In this respect, the Fund’s resources were 
utterly inadequate for the task of re-establishing an international payments system and they would 
soon be burnt in defence of a fixed exchange rates regime (Williams 1943 and 1944b). 
 
Lessons of the 1920s had not been learnt too well also from another standpoint. Williams 
recalled that, under the weak supervision of the League of Nations, a wave of doubtful loans were 
launched in attempts to support uneconomic levels of fixed exchange rates. He also added that 
monetary reforms in the interwar years had disastrous effects for Wall Street and the network of 
peripheral countries, because “we lent too freely and then stopped altogether”.  
 
As he wrote in a statement prepared for the Federal Reserve Board, Williams feared that the 
process of establishing new exchange parities would provoke a massive wave of destabilizing 
speculations and disorders in financial markets. Should that occur, the Fund risked being discredited 
for a long time: its fate would be doomed even before it had officially started its lending operations. 
A more viable solution was to reach a bilateral agreement on the sterling-dollar exchange rate. 
Therefore, the soundest alternative solution was to follow the method of trial and error, beginning 
with the key currencies. 
 
Secondly, White’s and Keynes’ projects were too premature. Williams’ most telling 
criticism of both plans was that they completely failed to distinguish between the problems of the 
transition and the problems of peace, between Western Europe’s immediate financial requirements 
and the shock-absorbing activities of the new Stabilization fund (Williams 1943, 151ff). In a vast 
number of essays and reports he tried to prove the point that both plans were characterized by the 
lack of attention to transitional problems. The Fund and the World Bank could not cope with the 
problems of transition. They had limited resources while uncertainty about what European future 
and economic performance was great. Williams anticipated that it would take at least five years 
before Great Britain could be ready for multilateral trade and the elimination of current account 
restrictions because of the large volume of inconvertible sterling balances accumulated in foreign 
countries.
48 He also feared that the setting up of an International Monetary Fund could obscure the 
need to arrange relief and reconstruction and to be a scapegoat for US responsibilities as the “key” 
country.  
 
At this stage, Williams was among the first economists who warned against the danger of a 
possible scarcity of key currencies – namely a dollar shortage – if the IMF was to be employed in 
the transition or to finance the settlement of sterling blocked balances. Williams denounced the fact 
that increased post-war demand for dollars could not be satisfied by the Fund’s resources while the 
new institution would soon be converted into a stagnant reservoir of unwanted currencies: “Very 
soon after the beginning of operations the Fund will be long of the weaker currencies and short of 
the key currencies in which international transactions are actually carried out”.
49  
 
As the negotiations proceeded, Williams’ dilemma began to receive widespread 
consideration and new technical provisions against the dangers of a dollar shortage were approved 
by the delegations of experts. Williams believed that some of them represented important 
improvements in the monetary mechanics of the Fund. Particularly those which introduced the 
scarce currency clause, imposed progressive interest rate charges and established forms of 
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repurchase agreements, went in the right direction. In his opinion, however, these remedies still 
remained a “second best” solution, if compared to the approval of a transitory system based on the 
key currency plan. Williams dismissed as politically unfeasible the option that – should the dollar 
shortage occur – the Fund imposed “buy backs” of weak currencies with dollar reserves that 
member countries possessed outside the Fund. Moreover, he was convinced that the Fund 
machinery did not technically allow for a dollar appreciation because this decision could never be 
taken unilaterally without a previous Washington consensus.
50 As a consequence of the dollar 
shortage, Williams correctly anticipated that the Fund might soon need to be refinanced by some 
borrowing arrangement with the leading financial powers which would contribute to the 
undermining of its authority and political independence.
51 
 
Finally, the two official plans had too many theoretical and technical shortcomings. For the 
author of the key currency plan, three of them were particularly noteworthy. 
 
First, both plans bore too close a family relationship with the textbook type description of 
the gold standard and their success depended on the circumstance that surplus and deficit economies 
behaved in a flexible and symmetric way. As far as the adjustment mechanisms of external 
disequilibria was concerned, Williams observed that the rationale of both plans was weak: not only 
did they neglect the role and weight of domestic policies in ensuring prospects for stability and 
growth but what was worse they almost completely failed “to mention the need for internal 
adjustment” (Williams 1944a, 171). Stabilization, in fact, was just a misnomer since “all the 
stabilization measures are left out”.
52 Drawing from his early academic writings, Williams wrote 
that international stability depended mainly on the internal stability and growth of the leading 
economies, while both plans followed a global approach and were based on a principle of equality 
in the world’s currencies which simply did not exist
53. Key countries – he urged – must express a 
strong and explicit commitment to economic stabilization: “The best prospect for general stability is 
to be found in internal stability in the leading countries” (Williams 1937, 49) while “economic 
conditions of young countries primarily reflect the conditions existing in the great world markets, 
for which they are only secondarily responsible” (Williams 1943, 152). Stability and mutual co-
operation at the centre produced positive externalities to the benefit of the peripheral countries: 
“There is no dilemma between internal and external monetary stability as has been frequently 
emphasised in abstract analysis”. 
 
Since their first draft, Keynes’ and White’s proposals for a new international institution did 
not consider the kind of corrective measures that countries were obliged to impose in order to 
ensure or regain domestic economic stability as a prerequisite of international stability. 
Undoubtedly, the reasons for this omission were “in part political”, because core countries were 
unwilling to subscribe hard commitments or surrender national sovereignty (Williams 1944a). 
However, having been a long-time reader of Keynes, Williams was surprised by “the lightness of 
touch” he had found in the Clearing Union plan on domestic economic reforms and stabilization 
policies (Williams 1943, 151). He found one plausible answer in Keynes’ confidence that the new 
world organization would soon become a forum which provided a form of efficient world 
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government. This was a rather platonic vision of the world, as Williams wrote to the Governor of 
the Bank of Canada, since the establishment of a system of fixed exchange rates was a long way 
from complete surrender of national sovereignty to a bunch of illuminated technocrats.
54  
 
Second, the two plans would soon find a deadlock in what is nowadays called the 
“impossible trilemma”. In fact, Williams feared that the Fund’s mechanics would feed an insoluble 
alternative between fixed exchange rates, free capital movements and the independent pursuit of 
monetary policies. In his reports to the Board of Governors, Williams recalled that, as Keynes 
himself had shown in The Treatise on Money, this trilemma could again find a solution in a world 
with supra-national monetary authorities which effectively exerted their coercive powers on capital 
movements. Such a world – Williams warned – simply did not exist. On the contrary, as it was 
expected that in the post-war era, most nations would follow independent economic and monetary 
policies, countries would not be able to defend their exchange rate parity in the presence of perfect 
capital mobility. In this perspective Williams also warned against the great practical difficulty of 
distinguishing between transactions on current account – which should remain free – and those on 
capital account – which White’s Fund temporarily allowed to prohibit by the retention of national 
systems of exchange control.
55  
 
Third, White’s and Keynes’s plans provided no workable condition for the eligibility of IMF 
loans. In particular the agreements contained no definition of what was meant by temporary 
disequibrium of the external accounts. A related problem was that IMF rules did not indicate what 
should happen, when and if the key countries which issued the world reserve currencies should run 
persistent current account deficits. On this account, Williams denounced both plans on the grounds 
that they contained only a sketchy treatment and no precise definition of the principle of 
conditionality. Again, the Harvard economist anticipated that the Fund would never be influential 
enough to promote – and in some cases impose – the appropriate financial policies on the borrowing 
countries. He feared that most members of the new institution would retain an unconditional and 
automatic drawing right, regardless of their creditworthiness. Making use of his familiar distinction, 
he believed that key countries would never accept a curtailment of their economic sovereignty or 
submit their policy decisions to the sort of necessary scrutiny implied by conditionality.  
 
Williams’ remarks on conditionality showed great perceptiveness of what would become the 
real burning issue in the history of the International Monetary Fund. If the Fund became a passive 
transfer agent with no active discretionary authority, Williams wrote that its resources would not be 
preserved for a long time while its credibility would rapidly be undermined and the seeds for its 
rapid failure be planted. On this issue, he thought that Keynes’ plan fared better, because whatever 
conditionality the Stabilization Fund managed to acquire, it would sooner or later be weakened by 
the US refusal to grant borrowing powers.  
 
These criticisms struck the target and were the origin of a violent controversy within the 
Administration. Although the pace of his publications was somewhat reduced as the Conference 
date approached, Williams anticipated that the Bretton Woods agreements were doomed to fail. In 
an official statement to the Board of Governors, Williams marked it as a “rubber stamp 
conference”.
56 On the grounds of the insurmountable difficulties to present a uniform view, he 
supported Governor Eccles for the fact that “he has not made up his mind, re[garding] the Board 
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position on the fund”.
57 Nevertheless he thought that, after two years of negotiations, what remained 
of the original Keynes’ plan or of all the projects related to investment and commercial policy, was 
of little substance: “teeth should be put in this plan while the experts have taken out everything that 




4.2. The Key Currency Plan 
 
In Spring 1943, at the time that discussions on the new international monetary system began 
to acquire momentum, Williams presented his key currency plan (Williams 1943). Quite obviously, 
like Keynes and White, Williams’ plan drew on the experience of the interwar years. One could 
speculate that while the two official plans were more influenced by the 1930s debates and new deal 
policies to find a way out from international disintegration, Williams was more concerned with the 
failure of the 1920s League of Nations stabilization programmes.  
 
When the plan came out, most contemporaries observed that its strength was more in the 
critical suggestions towards the official plans rather than in the technical and institutional 
innovations. Keynes himself contributed to form this judgement. In his personal copy of Williams’ 
first Foreign Affairs article, Keynes had noted with approval: “A very intelligent and moderate 
criticism”. Twelve months later, when the Joint Statement was about to appear in press, in a 
personal letter to Lord Catto, Keynes added the following comment: “this is an able article, but its 
criticism is much better than its constructive proposals – which are almost nil”.
59  
 
Williams was quite upset to find out that the various official drafts which circulated across 
the Atlantic contained “not a word about my preferred approach of going from the big countries to 
the smaller ones. A world-wide approach to an International Monetary Fund is the wrong approach, 
based as it is on an inadequate theory of international trade organization. Bad idea to apply one 
system to all countries since they are at different stages of development and have different 
functions”.
60 Nevertheless, Keynes’ remarks were quite correct and, as a matter of fact, the 
technical clauses of Williams’ plan were never spelled out in great detail, even though careful 
examination of his published writings, congressional hearings and written reports provide a slightly 
different picture. His plan contained some original insights – particularly for what was regarded as 
the rationale of a more limited approach to international monetary reform. In what follows we will 
briefly examine some of its most interesting features.  
 
The exchange rate system 
We have already noted that Williams’s plan was based on the premises that currencies of 
member nations were not of equal quality and acceptability in international transactions and that in 
a multilateral trading system most transactions were settled with just two or three currencies 
(Williams 1943). By definition, key currencies were those most commonly demanded as 
international means of payment. On these grounds, Williams believed that one crucial condition for 
post-war recovery of world trade and international investment was the stability of the “key 
currencies” exchange rate. As he put it in a meeting at the Federal Reserve Board, “the essence of 
monetary stability is to stabilize the major currency and all else flows from that. If you do that it is 
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much easier to permit of exchange controls and exchange rate variations for the younger countries. 
This does not really affect stability”.
61  
 
Thus, Williams’ plan favoured a two-speed approach to monetary reform by permitting 
different paths of adjustment to convertibility and multilateralism. The first stage was characterized 
by the stabilization of the key currencies – notably the bilateral dollar/sterling exchange rate – with 
flexible fluctuations of all other currencies. Only in a later phase, in fact, would non-key countries 
be allowed to join an international monetary system based on fixed exchange rates and managed by 
supranational institutions. 
 
The cornerstones of Williams’ exchange rate agreement between the two key currencies 
were also quite simple and were represented by a slightly modernized version of the 1936 Tripartite 
agreement: they basically consisted in an exclusive monetary agreement between England and the 
United States with the fixing of a new exchange rate parity; parities could not be changed without 
preliminary consultations while both central banks were required to purchase each other’s currency 
in specified amounts and with specific safeguards against losses; more currencies were gradually 
included in the new agreement once their external value was sufficiently in line with purchasing 




The institutional setting 
One fundamental implication of the plan was that, in an imperfect world, no major effort of 
institutional design should be undertaken, at least until more stable economic and political relations 
between major trading countries were satisfactorily restored. In particular, Williams advised 
strongly against the establishment of an International Monetary Fund before serious progress was 
made in the post-war transition. New economic institutions could be designed only after the 
foundation of a new political institution. As he wrote to Rasminsky: “A world organization for 
monetary stabilization ought to be a sub-head under whether there is to be some sort of a United 
Nations political set-up”.
63 The Fund was opposed as a matter of timing, not principle. He opposed 
starting it at a time when there was no hope of restoring multilateral trade and convertibility. 
 
Allan Meltzer’s reconstruction adds interesting details to this point. Meltzer shows how 
Williams and Sproul caused a stir when, alone among Fed officials, they testified in that vein before 
Congress in 1945. During the negotiations and in his meetings with Keynes, Williams endorsed the 
project of a World Development Bank viewing it as a more appropriate vehicle for easing the severe 
dislocations in the immediate post-war period. He suggested that the new Bank should be assigned 
more limited purposes of specific reconstruction investment loans. When the establishment of an 
International Stabilization agency appeared inevitable, Williams forcefully suggested that it were 
transformed into a special department of the World Bank. 
 
Nature of commitments  
An interesting aspect was Williams’ suggestion that credibility in commitments helped to 
create a more stable international monetary order. While discussing the “key currency plan”, 
Williams acknowledged that the establishment of soft but credible commitments increased the 
efficacy of stabilization policies and strengthened central bank cooperation. On these issues, he 
agreed that the Tripartite agreement lacked effective mechanisms for enforcing coordination. 
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Conversely, the White plan was based on “too many rules and regulations, too many pains and 
penalties, and too many functions for the new world governing body”.
64 If his anticipations were 
correct, the universal commitment to a fixed exchange rate regime would soon become hard to 
respect and would create credibility failures for the new institution inevitably leading to disasters of 
the League of Nations kind. As he put it in a Statement at a Meeting of the Governors Board, “we 
risk a setback in the cause of international cooperation”.
65  
 
Although the key currency approach generically called for a closer co-ordination of 
domestic monetary policies between the leading economies, Williams never explained the way this 
objective could be practically achieved. 
 
Optimal currency areas 
His interpretation of the functioning of past monetary system – together with his preference 
for a two-speed monetary integration – led Williams to believe in the optimality of currency areas 
which implied the participation of a limited number of countries. As he put it, different kinds of 
countries require different kinds of monetary systems (Williams 1944b). In his writings, Williams 
wondered about the optimal degree of internationalism and the formation of currency areas. He 
thought that the establishment of fixed exchange standards had more relevance for the few 
advanced countries than for the many “less developed countries”. In most cases, their economic 
system depended on the production of few primary commodities with extremely volatile terms of 
trade. Moreover, many backward economies were often characterized by a very low degree of trade 
integration which reduced the potential benefits of a fixed exchange rate regime. Particularly during 
the presumably long period of transition and reconstruction, small and open economies would have 
all the advantages in maintaining flexible exchanges as a shock absorber policy instrument. 
Therefore, for them, greater exchange rate flexibility and control were the most appropriate policy 
and this was a further point on behalf of the “key currency plan”.  
 
US Treasury economists found some merit in this argument, and Edward Bernstein agreed 
that greater exchange rate variability was needed to offset asymmetric shocks and the deterioration 
of the terms of trade [Bernstein 1944 and 1968]. However, Williams’ proposal was dismissed 
because it was agreed that less developed countries could get what they needed as insiders of the 
new international monetary order after consultation with the Fund, rather than as outsiders who 
decided to act unilaterally. On their part, during the negotiations, small countries with open 
economies favourably viewed the possibility of adopting a key currency approach to monetary 
reform. France and Holland presented a lengthy memorandum which sponsored the adoption of 
Williams’s plan. Many countries felt that more time was needed for exchange rate negotiations to 
be put on a stable and realistic basis.  
 
Balance of power or hegemony? 
Williams saw geopolitical reasons on behalf of the key currency approach. He was sceptical 
that the United States was really ready to face their global responsibilities as the world’s largest 
creditor nation. According to the Harvard economist the United States was unwilling to manage its 
economy in such a way as to assure stability and growth to the rest of the world. He expressed these 
feelings in his meeting with Keynes with great frankness. “I said we were a creditor country in a 
very mixed sense […] This makes our problem vastly more difficult than England’s in the 19
th 
century. To put it in a few words, we were apt to be self-righteous about currency stability but 
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unwilling to live up to the obligations of a creditor nations”.
66 Also for these reasons, gradualism 
and flexibility implied by the key currency approach was more fit to steer US administration 
through the hurdles of isolationism and the like. 
 
 
5. In the heat of the negotiations: Williams, White and Keynes 
 
5.1. First reactions 
Williams’ proposal was widely debated in the crucial 18 months which went from the first 
draft of Keynes’ clearing union plan to the Bretton Woods conference.
67  
 
At least in the very early stages of the negotiations, the key currency approach was viewed 
sympathetically, particularly in British quarters and among experts representing small and open 
economies (Horsefield 1969, 32ff). Oxford economist Redvers Opie confessed that when the 
proposal came out he found some attraction in it, although as economic adviser to the British 
Ambassador in Washington he felt compelled to support the case for a broad international solution 
[Opie 1957]. In a private correspondence with a Federal Reserve Economist, Roy Harrod recalled to 
have had a long conversation with Keynes on Williams’ project, even before the Clearing Union 
proposal had been conceived or put into paper.
68 Other British economists thought that some 
preferential arrangement between the two reserve currencies could usefully become part of the lend-
lease agreement and a possible concession against the promised reduction of British trade 
discrimination. The Bank of England and the British Treasury supported Williams’ plan as a 
prerequisite for the survival of the sterling area. Also Ralph Hawtrey favoured the establishment of 
a close Anglo-American partnership, with the understanding that each country maintained domestic 
price stability and mutually supported the exchange rate.
69  
 
From the outset things were quite different in the Usa where most reactions banned the 
possible adoption of Williams’ proposal from the diplomatic agenda. In particular, the State 
department never considered the key currency plan as a realistic option to be explored. On the 
contrary, in order to make article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement a credible commitment, the 
State Department required that most nations were to be brought into White’s plan on a fully equal 
basis. The issue – as Roy Harrod recalled in a letter to Rosa – was not “one between the British (or 
Keynes) and the Americans” and the option on Williams’ proposal was never seriously considered: 
“it was settled by the definite attitude of the State Department, well before Williams’ proposal [was 
formulated in detail]. By 1943 it was chose jujee (sic!)”.
70 
 
Also the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board reacted rather bitterly. On various 
occasions, the Board attempted to silence Williams and Sproul. An official note was circulated 
through the Federal Reserve System which cautioned, among other things, that “public expressions 
of differences of opinion within the System would tend to impair effective representation at the 
international conference and to destroy any influence that the System might have”.
71 On different 
occasions, at Morgenthau’s request, Eccles recommended that Williams desisted from criticism of 
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White’s plan. The Governor’s interventions were unusually severe: he threatened not to renew 
Williams’ appointment, tried to prevent his Senate testimony, and finally asked the Board to 
dismiss him because “his part time job [as vice President and research director] left him free to 
make public statements”. On their part, Williams and Sproul made no commitment to be bound by 
the Board’s position and refused to accept the restriction that their comments remained within the 
framework established by the official proposals (Meltzer 2003, 523). The New York Fed voted 
unanimously in October 1943 and June 1944 to endorse the position taken by the two top senior 
officials.  
 
When the debate heated up, Williams became the leading spokesman for the New York 
financial community and recurrent references were made in support of his plan. The bankers’ 
conservative attitudes were sympathetic of the more modest approach of the key currency plan, and 
open tributes were paid to its greater realism and far-sightedness. Williams’ plan was more useful in 
transition; it provided greater prospective stability, easing an extension of the 1936 Tripartite 
agreement; it proposed ad hoc stabilization agreements tied to gold. Fraser (First National Bank), 
Riddle (Bankers Trust) and Aldrich (Chase National Bank) were among the most influential 
bankers who supported the key currency approach. US bankers generally resented having lost 
control over international monetary affairs when authority was shifted from the New York Fed to 
the US Treasury under Secretary Morgenthau.
72 In this respect, Williams’ rejection of the new 
international monetary institutions gained open support from the American Bankers Association as 
a way to reduce the loss of monetary sovereignty. His plan had also some support in Congress, 
because – as some members saw it – it called simply for a resurrection of the gold exchange 
standard, with the dollar performing the role that sterling had played previously (Ruggie 1982).  
 
Most of these reactions coincided with the Washington monetary talks of September-
October 1943. In the history of the negotiations which prepared the Bretton Woods agreements, this 
round of meetings between experts remain perhaps the most influential episode. For more than three 
weeks the two official plans were confronted, readapted and redrafted. By the end of October, both 
plans were merged into what would become the skeleton of the Joint statement of experts which 
provided the intellectual and technical background to the Bretton Woods agreements. Only few 
specific points were still left undecided. When the two delegations adjourned it was agreed that the 
new international monetary system was to be based on White’s Stabilization Fund. In exchange the 
British delegation obtained important concessions on a number of technical points, the most 
important of which were a greater amount of exchange rate flexibility, a greater amount of 
members’ contributions, a more rigid maintenance of exchange controls over capital movements, 
and the approval of more liberal conditions to withdraw from the new institution.
73 
 
In his accurate reconstruction of this process, L. S. Pressnell has observed that “these 
informal, non committal talks of September-October 1943 … were the most important Anglo-
American exchanges on economic issues not only during the war but also for many years before and 
since. They were indeed unique; they were conducted at a high intellectual level, ranging frankly 
over virtually the whole field of economic policy … these talks had a lasting … significance: … 
they registered and clarified issues and points of agreement ” (Pressnell 1986, p.116).  
 
It was at this very crucial stage of the negotiations that Williams had the opportunity to 
discuss his ideas with Keynes and White. Although Williams was not allowed to participate in the 
                                                           
72 On this issue the literature is large. See, among others, Fraser 1945; Van Dormael 1978; Garritsen de Vries 1996; 
Meltzer 2003. 
73 Keynes told Williams that the American delegation had made very generous concessions on these points and that “a 
good deal of progress was made on this visit”. J. H. Williams ,”Our Meeting with Keynes”, 20 October 1943, The 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Williams papers.   25
Washington talks, following Morgenthau’s and White’s advice Keynes sought to gain the blessing 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in order to reconcile and strengthen the prospects of 
Congressional approval. In his visit to the New York bankers Keynes found that they were less 
obstinately opposed to the idea of an organized fund than had been considered to be the case in 
Washington. As other British delegates, perhaps Keynes was convinced that most of the problems 
with the US monetary authorities lay with the decision taken by the Roosevelt administration in the 
mid-1930s to confer to the US Treasury full powers in the management of monetary policy rather 
than in an insurmountable opposition to the plan. “The real evil”, so James Meade confirmed in his 
wartime diary, was that central bankers and the financial community “were left so ignorant of the 
real intentions of the US Treasury” (Howson and Moggridge 1990, 22 Oct. 1943). 
 
In their meetings with Williams, Keynes and White took into consideration some of the 
arguments of the key currency plan. They both disagreed on the fundamental issue which regarded 
the two-speed approach, argued that reopening the agreement would not produce a better 
agreement, but found some merit in Williams’ ideas. We will briefly discuss their reactions 
separately. 
 
5.2. White’s reactions 
On July 1943, two months after the official plans were published and on the eve of the 
invitation of 46 countries to participate to their discussion, Harry Dexter White wrote to John 
Maynard Keynes to inform him that Williams’ Foreign Affairs article on the key currency plan 
appeared “to be having rather wide distribution”. Enclosed to his letter, White sent a copy of 
Williams’ article with the purpose of letting Keynes have the taste “of the kind of opposition there 
is developing in the United States to efforts for any comprehensive scheme of post-war monetary 
proposals” (Keynes 1980, 337). 
 
White’ reactions to Williams’ plans generally followed a geopolitical approach: in most of 
his comments, he repeatedly noted the existence of many political hurdles which hindered the 
adoption of Williams’ monetary plans. He thought that Williams as well as the advocates of the key 
currency approach were reasoning in a political vacuum.
74  
 
First, White thought that it was politically unwise to appear to impose Anglo-American 
leadership or, to put it otherwise, to leave many European countries outside the Agreement and 
unable to contribute to the new monetary order. Should the key currency approach be followed, 
Europe would never be fully integrated into a new multilateral payments system. Second, the 
adoption of Williams’ plan was viewed as a possible threat to dollar supremacy, because it 
artificially restored an international role for sterling, while it tended to underestimate the financial 
needs of British reconstruction. To put it more explicitly, White argued that the key currency 
approach was a gift to England and its desire for some spare hegemonic supremacy. On the 
contrary, emphasis in the US official plans on free convertibility, multilateralism and stable 
exchange rates were all designed to limit London’s capacity to organize a separate trading bloc, 
while Williams’ plan, which deferred the establishment of a truly international system could be 
functional to British interests of continued trade discrimination. White also believed that exchange 
restrictions and discriminatory currency arrangements would be maintained – if not strengthened – 
by the adoption of the key currency approach which would not guarantee the solution of the scarce 
currency problem. Finally, as is well known, White was a fervent advocate of eastward enlargement 
and argued that, for political reasons, China and Russia could not be excluded from the new 
monetary order.
75 
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There were also more technical motivations in the background of White’s opposition to the 
key currency approach. He believed that it was likely to lead to the establishment and perpetuation 
of closed trading systems with trade between these system conducted on a bilateral rather than on a 
multilateral basis.
76 He also noted that too many countries could have their own key currency with 
respect to single commodities while non-key currency countries accounted for over 75% of world 
trade. Moreover, the absence of an international organization – which the key currency approach 
implied – rendered more difficult the adoption of common rules and standards with respect to 
exchange and foreign investment practices. On this issue, he strongly affirmed that the Fund had 
essential functions to perform during the period of transition. Although the demand for 
reconstruction loans could not be satisfied, nevertheless the new institution could usefully operate to 
re-establish world confidence in a system of orderly exchange rate variations. Finally, together with 
other American economists, White expressed his conviction that the key currency approach bore too 
close a resemblance to the Norman plan which dramatically failed to bring results in the 1920s. If 
Britain was granted the status of “key country” she was quite likely to refuse to participate in major 
programmes of external financing because foreign loans would drain resources and produce 
deflation and unemployment at home.
77 
 
White also stated that the most convincing aspects of the key currency plan were already 
embodied in his proposal.
78 The dollar was bound to become the key currency of the new system. 
His plan provided some safeguards against the risks of a premature participation of countries which 
were not yet qualified to operate with the IMF: the new institution, in fact, had the powers to delay 
the beginning of lending operations with particular areas or countries, and it could arrive to the 
decision to refuse to fix the initial parity.
79 On matters of exchange rate policy, White believed that 
Williams’ plan would excessively increase exchange rate flexibility and provide incentives to ease 
unilateral alterations of exchange rates (Horsefield 1969, 84). On this point, he feared that the 
British delegation might see some reasons to recognize the cogency of Williams’ ideas. However, 
Keynes promptly reassured White that he no longer had a strong faith in the expansionary role of 
exchange rate depreciations and that the British would not support Williams’ plan on this issue.  
 
 
5.3. Keynes’s reactions 
 
Keynes’s critical reactions to Williams’ proposal were in part inspired by reasons of political 
opportunity and in part by theoretical conviction.  
 
As the negotiations preceded, Keynes was persuaded that the official plans should never be 
intended to deal with transition problems.
80 However, in his conversations with Williams, Keynes 
insisted that the institutional machinery for the long run should have been put into operation 
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immediately after the war. Only in this way could international multilateralism in trade and finance 
be effectively restored. He gave several reasons which largely depended on political opportunity 
rather than on its greater technical efficiency. As he confessed to Williams, “one was the familiar 
one that we now have the opportunity, if ever, and if we wait we may lose it. Another was that there 
had now been so much consulting of other governments that both the British and the American 
Treasury feel that there can be no turning back. Another was that there will be work for the 
stabilization plan to do even from the outset, that some countries will already be in proper shape for 
it, and here he mentioned the United States, the Dominions, the Latin American countries, and 
England (assuming that England has found ways for handling her immediate problems)”.
81 
 
In his October 1943 meeting with Williams, Keynes also put it very clearly that Britain and 
sterling no longer held a key position in international trade and finance. To restore its role as a key 
country she needed US assistance while he guessed that she would prefer to apply to the Fund and 
reap the advantages of anonymous borrowing rather than “come to us with her hat in her hand and 
ask for help”.
82 As a founding member of the new Stabilization fund Britain may be able to 
aggregate consensus from small countries and would not always prefigure a subordinate role 
dependent on American loans.
83 This point had already been dealt upon at a meeting of Treasury 
experts in September 1943 where a further concern was raised against the adoption of the key 
currency plan:
84 it was observed that the divergent rates of the various pounds showed that the 
members of the sterling area were already pursuing independent monetary policies while Britain 
was not in a position to dictate policy rules to the sterling area as she might be required to do under 
the key country approach. Finally, Keynes added that particularly the Bank of England and 
Montagu Norman had not been keen in entering into a borrowing arrangement with the US, “they 
couldn’t live up to”.
85 In many British quarters it was hoped that the new institution and the world 
bank could provide some more generalized borrowing arrangements. 
 
However, unlike White’s, Keynes’ remarks against the possible adoption of the key 
currency plan also depended on its technical features.  
 
In their meetings, Keynes expressed some appreciation with several aspects of Williams’ 
critical campaign against White’s stabilization plan. Keynes agreed that the Fund’s resources were 
rather disappointing in relation to the future growth prospects of world trade and that the surrender 
of sovereignty was too marginal. Keynes explicitly agreed that the Fund’s machinery was not a cure 
for every post-war problem and that loans from the Fund had never been conceived of as something 
vital for western European reconstruction, but rather “as oil for the machinery… breathing space”.
86 
Keynes also agreed with Williams that the discipline of conditionality was the really weak point in 
the Joint Statement and that it was bound to remain the burning issue of the Fund’s operations for a 
long time. In their private conversations he justified the vagueness of many clauses regarding the 
principle of conditionality in terms of their political feasibility. In fact, discussing this issue with 
Williams, Keynes observed that the Fund “would not last two years if it were butting into domestic 
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policies”: he did not think “England or any other country would accept interference with its 
domestic policies”.
87 Quite to the contrary, in an effort to increase its authority and independence 
during the first period of operations Keynes thought that the Fund must be “kept clear of internal 
problems but it is entitled (though he should be careful) to make a report as to what it considers the 
cause of the basic disequilibrium”.
88 Therefore, Keynes agreed with Williams’ basic observation 
that much work and a lot of time were required in order to make the new commitments realistic and 
efficient. He objected, however, that the new system could not contemplate the gradualism implied 
by the key currency approach nor the maintenance of flexible exchange rates for all other members. 
On this point, Keynes confessed to Williams that he had little faith in the use of exchange rate 
variations as a macro stabilization instrument. Contrary to what he had advocated in the early 
1920s, he favoured exchange stability, agreed that nations ought to preserve some measure of 
freedom to change the parity but thought that this freedom had to be used very rarely, and “only 
when it was clearly proved that this is the best method of adjustment”.
89 
 
In line with Williams’ philosophy, Keynes admitted his support for the redefinition of the 
nature of the general commitment in order to reduce its stringency and increase its credibility 
among member countries. Member countries would be persuaded to take all the necessary measures 
to respect soft but realistic commitments. Keynes believed that an opt-out clause might help: “one 
way to do it was not the key currency approach but to allow free right to withdraw”. In fact, this 
concession would lessen fears of member countries “about the extent of their commitment and 
encourage a general acceptance of the plans, and that afterwards, when they were in, they would 
find themselves under a strong moral compulsion to stay in and work out their differences within 
the framework of the plans”.
90 Williams replied that this was a good point but still thought that the 
risk of failure of the new institutions should not be minimized. Countries might even go “to the 




Keynes consulted with Williams on a number of issues. They found themselves in complete 
agreement on the opportunity to grant member countries freedom to maintain exchange controls. In 
Williams’ written memories of their first meeting, it was at this point that Keynes admitted that one 
further reason for controversy with the American administration remained the question of exchange 
control. Keynes spoke against the US Treasury view which pressed for the earliest possible 
abandonment of all currency restrictions. On the contrary he favoured a high level of post-war 
planning of foreign trade and exchange transactions, warning against the feasibility of any 
distinction between the capital account and the current account. As he put it, the control of capital 
movements implied an overall system of exchange control: what had been learnt in the 1930s 
should not be dispersed in the post-war world and British authorities had acquired strong 
reputations in the effectiveness of controls. As Williams recalled,  
                                                           
87 The first Keynes’ quotation is taken from J. H. Williams, “Memorandum on a Meeting of the Board of Directors”, 17 
August, 1944, while the second is taken from J. H. Williams ,”Our Meeting with Keynes”, 20 October 1943. Both 
documents are in The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Williams papers. 
88 J. H. Williams, “Memorandum on a Meeting of the Board of Directors”, 17 August, 1944, The Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York, Williams papers. Keynes was also present. 
89 On his part, Williams openly confessed his surprise to learn that on matters of exchange rate policy lord Keynes had 
completely different views from the John Maynard Keynes he had read for the last 10 years. Quite likely, Keynes 
referred to Meade’s proposal for an objective test of exchange rate variations which the LSE economist had brought to 
the attention of the Committee on trade policy. See, on this point, Howson and Moggridge 1990 and Horsefield 1969. 
Keynes’ views on the efficacy of exchange rate policy are again taken from J. H. Williams ,”Our Meeting with 
Keynes”, 20 October 1943, The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Williams papers. 
90 J. H. Williams ,”Our Meeting with Keynes”, 20 October 1943, The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Williams 
papers. 
91 J. H. Williams ,”Our Meeting with Keynes”, 20 October 1943, The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Williams 
papers.   29
 
Keynes said he thought he had done some educating of our Treasury on this point, that his assistant 
(I think he said Mr Ausland) was a Bank of England man who understood their exchange control 
thoroughly, and he had been taken Bernstein aside and apparently having considerable effect upon 
him. Keynes said that the British view now is that we must control capital movements and cannot 
do so without an over-all exchange control. The transactions that they wish to leave free they 
authorise under a general license, but all transactions have to be reported. He urged us strongly to 
send a man over to the Bank of England to study their exchange control.
92 
 
Williams and Keynes agreed on the relatively greater efficacy of direct methods of 
intervention, which ranged from import quotas to voluntary export restraints on the part of creditor 
countries. Again, in Williams’ memories “we asked whether under his scheme there could be also a 
control of exports of merchandise, and Keynes replied that he didn’t see why not if that were really 
necessary. All this interested me very much”.
93 They also agreed on the need to avoid the blocking 
of foreign assets in order to stimulate direct investments. “What we need, therefore, is a partial 
control, giving a country control over its own capital, and this would probably be sufficient to 
handle the hot money problem”.
94 
 
However, for what concerned the official plans under discussion, unlike Williams Keynes 
saw many positive externalities in the establishment of a Stabilization Fund. He thought that the 
Fund would contribute to strengthen international co-operation and the quality of information in 
monetary affairs, thus increasing the efficacy of monetary policy. The Fund would perform its role 
of international monetary management with increasing authority and soon become “the platform 
where central banks will come together and consider matters of public interest”.
95 The new 
institution could usefully become “the current barometer and give clear warnings on changes in 
weather conditions”. In terms of its technical mechanics, Keynes strongly rebutted Williams’ 
criticism affirming that the Fund would provide “a code of conduct with regard to exchange 
practices and orderly methods of making exchange changes and to constitute a consultative body”.
96 
He anticipated that the Fund would become an international body with “considerable authority” 
over the manner in which exchange rate variations were determined. At the current stage of the 
negotiations Keynes strongly affirmed that a withdrawal was no longer possible unless a loss of 
prestige would undermine any future plan for institutional design.  
 
Williams remained quite unconvinced by Keynes’ arguments in defence of the Fund. He 
replied that the art of central banking was based on selectivity while the Fund’s approach was too 
general and unconditional. On this occasion he spoke in favour of the Clearing Union plan as a real 
piece of institutional innovation and international monetary authority. What was really needed was 
a bank with full corrective powers which were exercised through interest rate policy and discretion. 
Keynes replied that while quotas were maxima of right, the Fund had the authority to increase them 
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and even to create new means of international liquidity. These decisions largely depended on its 






Williams’ plans and activities for a new monetary order were part of one of the most 
fascinating episodes in the history of economic ideas and policy making.  
 
In this paper we have tried to show Williams’ main contributions as an international 
economist and monetary reformer. In particularly, we have briefly explored the analytical rationale 
of his key currency approach and the reasons why Williams fiercely campaigned against the two 
official plans which represented the intellectual background to the Bretton Woods agreements. To 
do so, we have shown how his policy proposals were the outcome of his doctrinal rejection of the 
two main tenets of classical economics in the international field: namely, the Ricardian theory of 
comparative advantages and the gold standard. From his early academic writings Williams found 
inspiration to create a stabilization plan which put special emphasis on the unequal size and 
importance of national countries, on the international repercussions of key countries’ domestic 
economic policies, and on the disturbing effects of international capital movements. We have also 
shown the many and prestigious reactions which Williams’ plan managed to provoke, together with 
the contents of his conversations with Keynes on the pros and cons of the monetary system under 
construction. Analysis of their conversations has led us to conclude that the two economists had 
convergent views on a great number of issues which regarded the new architecture of the world 
monetary system. Keynes clearly admitted that political reasons prevented the British delegation 
from considering more carefully the inclusion of Williams’ plan in the diplomatic agenda, the most 
relevant being that Britain no longer held a “key country” position in the post-war world. 
 
From this reconstruction, what general conclusions can be drawn? 
 
Williams was able to foresee many problems of the post-war world. He correctly anticipated 
that the post-war world would for a long time still be dominated by renewed forms of bilateral and 
payments agreements and that to be successful all efforts towards the restoration of convertibility 
and outright multilateralism needed time, strong leadership and a lot of “green cheese”. He was also 
right to anticipate the failure of the Morgenthau-White international economic policy and its 
substitution with a policy that recognized the reality of American hegemonic power and political 
interests. For a long time, the United States operated unilaterally outside the institutions they had 
worked so hard to establish. The International Monetary Fund particularly remained inactive during 
the transition.  
 
At least indirectly, Williams succeeded in contributing to the significant improvement of the 
negotiations which were ultimately marked by the publication of the Joint Statement of Experts in 
April 1944. The Joint Statement clearly recognized the difference between the transition years and 
the long run; recognized the difference between exchange rate stability and exchange rate rigidity; 
approved the maintenance of national forms of active controls over capital movements. All these 
issues became evident during the October 1943 money talks and contemporary discussions on 
Williams’ plan helped to bring them to light. 
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One final point which was somehow related to the key currency approach was 
conditionality. Undoubtedly, discussions on conditionality and the dollar shortage were stimulated 
by Williams’ writings even though further research efforts might help to clarify this point. In his 
writings he urged that the Fund’s modest financial resources should not be used to liquidate the 
war-time indebtedness. Gaining strong consent in financial quarters – beginning with the open 
blessing coming from the American Bankers Association – Williams feared that the International 
Monetary Fund would be called on a policy of making doubtful loans in order to defend the fixed 
parity of weak currencies. Automatic lending procedures would increase the Fund of poor 
currencies and decrease its holdings of valuable assets, running the risk of repeating the disastrous 
free lending policies of the 1920s which ultimately brought about a sudden reversal and a crisis. In 
line with Williams’ writings, the final articles of the Bretton Woods agreement recognized that the 
Fund was not intended to provide facilities for relief or reconstruction or to deal with international 
indebtedness. 
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